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PREFACE
The first part of the paper explains the main issues of the development of Russian
economy with the focus on the internationalization of industries and the rise of Russian
MNEs. The special focus is made on the outward FDI from Russia. The role of western
MNEs in the internationalization of Russian economy, and the emergence of Russian
MNEs are discussed in the chapter.
The second part presents the main approaches of Russian MNEs to the foreign
markets entry and post entry strategy development on the basis of the company cases
within particular industry. Each chapter contains the brief explanation of the industry
(main players – internationally and in Russia, methods of competition, product and
customers) and two cases, first is with the focus on the entry solution, and the second
is more about post entry operation models. Brief intersection with the theory of the
entry modes and investment strategies will be given in each chapter within the
description of the Russian MNEs operations. The choice of industries illustrates the
internationalization dynamics of Russian economy. The choice of case companies will
help better explain the selection of the Russian MNEs strategies and orientations.
The third part contains ‘special’ issues of the genesis of Russian MNEs. One is about
companies that are global by nature (being set to connect trade to West or being
established in the global e-industry). Second is about the strong focus / supporting
asset of the international strategy (marketing/brand in one case and government
involvement in another case).
The main findings are generalized in the conclusion with the stress on the focus of
outward FDI, policy context, and forms of entry and presence in foreign markets by
various Russian enterprises.
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INTRODUCTION
Over a historically brief period, Russia has become a major outward investing country
on the global stage. Russia’s registered OFDI stock increased from US$2 billion in
1993 to US$203 billion in 2008, making it the second largest among emerging
economies, behind Hong Kong (China) only (USD 776 billion in 2008). Russian MNEs
hold more FDI assets than Brazil (USD 162 billion), China (USD 148 billion) and India
(USD 62 billion) (annex table 1).
A number of Russian firms, like Gazprom, Lukoil, Rusal, Severstal, have already
attained a global status. Other firms, such as Alfa Bank, Sitronics, Wimm-Bill-Dann,
Yandex, are actively reaching the status of MNEs.
Despite Russian firms that expand internationally represent various industries, and
diverse in terms of motivations and strategies, they do share at least two key attributes.
One is their storming onto the global stage through the exploration of their natural-
resource based capabilities. Another is their strong link with the home country
government and the growing role of the Russian State in the rise of Russian
multinationals.
With regard to the geographical distribution of acquisitions abroad, data show that
Russian firms have generally targeted developed country firms, especially in Europe
and North America, despite the fact that the expansion of Russian MNEs sometimes
began in other member states of the CIS.
OFDI from Russia is both “exodus” and “expansion” in terms of the role of both home-
country factors that encourage firms to invest abroad and the attractiveness of foreign
locations for Russian firms. Exodus was strong in early 1990s (at the beginning of the
transition), followed by less escape in the mid-1990s; the crisis of 1998 prompted a rise
in capital escape, and then normalization again; the crisis of 2008 increased the
motivation of exodus once again.
The study of Russian multinationals should be started with three questions: 1) how do
they internationalize, and why; 2) what competitive advantages do they leverage as
they internationalize; 3) how is the rise of Russian MNEs affecting global industry
dynamics.
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1 RUSSIA: ADJUSTMENT TO INTERNATIONALIZATION
1.1 Earlier Studies on Emerging Multinationals and Russian MNEs
While the theory of firm internationalization has been built to explain the motivations
and strategies of firms from developed countries (mostly European and U.S.),
expanding to developing markets, there have been several attempts to test the
applicability of the established concepts to explain internationalization of companies
from less developed markets. Outward FDI and emerging economies’ MNEs were
investigated in the early pioneering studies of Heenan and Keegan (1979), Lall (1983),
Lecraw (1983) and Wells (1983), and in more recent works of Benito and Narula
(2007), Globerman and Shapiro (2006), Goldstein and Shaw (2007), Luo and Tung
(2007).
Besides, various international organizations (Economist, OECD, UNCTAD, World
Bank) have also paid considerable attention in the last decade to the
internationalization of firms from emerging economies. World Investment Reports, EIU
Country reports, UNCTAD papers, publications of Columbia University and Maastricht
University represent various types and extents of the interest to the EMNE
phenomenon.
While MNEs from developed economies concentrate on advanced technology and
marketing skills to differentiate their products (Wells, 1983), and see their competitive
advantage in having a large variety of assets, as well as in integrating operations
across national boundaries (Bartlett and Ghoshal 1989), EMNEs have been considered
to rely mostly on maturing technologies, originally developed in the Western countries.
The competitive advantage of these EMNEs appears, in most cases, to stem from the
application of appropriate managerial skills in less developed country environments
(Elenkov 1995).
According  Luo and Tung (2007), emerging MNEs use international expansion as a
springboard to: 1) compensate for their competitive disadvantages; 2) overcome their
latecomer disadvantage; 3) counter-attack global rivals’ major foothold in their home
country market; 4) bypass stringent trade barriers; 5) alleviate domestic institutional
constraints; 6) secure preferential treatment offered by emerging market governments;
7) exploit their competitive advantages in other emerging or developing markets.
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FDI flows towards less developed countries have not always resulted in the long-term
growth outcomes one would expect (Lipsey 2002; Tsang and Yip, 2007). Russia,
together with many other transition economies, faces the fundamental problem that it
has few alternatives to the outside injections of capital, knowledge and network
resources that FDI provides. Countries in transition in many respects appear to be
closer to developing than developed economies when it comes to their particular
experiences with hosting FDI (Jensen 2004).
At the same time, it is questionable whether local firms in transition countries benefit
much from the technological change introduced by foreign investors as is usually true
for developed host countries (Lipsey 2002; Blomström et al. 2001). Both pioneers and
current EMNEs gain from their natural-resource vertical integrator status hailing either
from a country richly endowed with natural resources or one with a large domestic
appetite for natural resources, with examples of Russian Gazprom and Lukoil, or
Brazilian Vale (Ramamurti 2008).
The mainstream research in the field of EMNEs has focused on the amount of outward
FDI. Moreover, FDI outflows from emerging economies have been often taken as a
proxy of activities of emerging multinationals (Filippov 2008). Such approach should be
challenged since the particular business motives and corporate strategies are
neglected if studying Russian MNEs primarily from the perspective of their OFDI.
Despite the interest, novelty and even provocative character of the topic of emerging
multinationals, the focus of most studies has been on Chinese, Indian, and Brazilian
MNEs, overlooking their Russian counterparts. While a range of studies on Russian
MNEs was developed since end of 1990s (Bulatov, 1998, 2001; Crane et al., 2005;
Filatotchev et al., 2007a; Heinrich, 2003, 2006; Kalotay, 2004, 2005, 2008; Kets de
Vries et al., 2004; Vahtra and Liuhto, 2006) the research in this field remains scarce.
Outward FDI from Russia started to grow in the second half of the 20th century;
nevertheless, it stayed at a very low level. At the end of the 1983, Soviet firms had
about 320 affiliates in foreign countries (Liuhto and Vahtra 2007), which is a really
small figure for an economy that big. These companies were often registered as joint
ventures and were mostly situated in Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA)
countries; there were about 115 affiliates in OECD and 30 in developing countries. In
1990, the Soviet FDI stock abroad amounted to less than $1 bln.
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The prototypes of multinationals existed already in the times of the USSR. In Russia as
well as in China, most of the leading EMNEs had roots going back to the Communist
days, long before they were partially or wholly privatized (Ramamurti 2008). In his
study of foreign operations of soviet firms (which all were state-owned), Geoffrey
Hamilton (1986) referred to these companies as “red multinationals”. His observation
showed that in most cases these companies carried out only marketing and sales
operations. Few of “red multinationals” showed signs of developing as Western
multinationals had done (Hamilton 1986; McMillan 1987).
The USSR usually exercised strict control upon these companies, and they were
usually majority-owned by their Soviet parents (Vahtra 2006). A majority of these firms
were involved in supporting Russian exports abroad (raw resources marketing,
infrastructure support – banking, insurance, etc.). These companies conducted their
activities very intensively, selling more than a half of 50% of Soviet products abroad.
One important issue from the previous study was made by one of pioneers in the field
Detelin Elenkov, who highlighted and investigated the importance of the military sector
in the context of the internationalization of the Russian economy. He explained the
depression of the non-military sector due to the irrational bureaucracy, corruption and
inefficiency in that sector. A key characteristic of the Soviet civilian sector was a system
of financing organizations rather than projects, which created a tendency of budget
allocation according to the size of organizations, while technological feasibility and
potential economic results of individual projects were of secondary importance.
Besides, the non-military sector was also technologically obsolete, due to the lack of
strong technical staff, close linkages with advanced R&D institutes and modern
equipment (Elenkov 1995). Though, the strong Russian military industry was nurtured
at the expense of the largely neglected civilian sector.
The crash of the Soviet Union brought about disruptions in previous economic
activities. The restauration from the shock and adaptation to new conditions took
almost 10 years for Russian companies. During this period, they were mostly involved
in restructurization and consolidation of assets inside the country; after having gained
enough power, they started to look onto foreign markets. Several studies documented
the process of transformation of these former state-owned enterprises (Filatotchev et al
2007b; King et al 1995).
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A wave of the FDI from Russian economy started to grow much faster at the end of the
1990s. “Until 2000, Gazprom and Lukoil accounted for around 90% of Russian assets
abroad”. (The Russians Are Coming 2006). On the eve of the 21st century, other
companies started to catch up. The main share of OFDI took form of cross-border
mergers and acquisitions, greenfield investments being present but in much smaller
forms, which reflects preference of Russian investors to go for quick returns and lack of
the from-the-bottom experience.
Kuznetsov (2010) points out a special type of MNEs. These are companies with foreign
capital participation. Thanks to these inward investments, Russian companies can
reinforce their own investment activities.
Kalotay (2005) suggests that the oligarchical structure of Russian economy may have
something to do with increasing level of FDI flows. He points out that the investing
pattern that Russia follows is more alike the countries at the higher stages of
development, and is not alike other BRIC countries, to which Russia is often compared.
The paradox is that it is the hostility of the home country business environment, on the
one hand, and the home government incentives expected, on the other hand, that
stimulates the Russian capital to go abroad (Panibratov and Kalotay 2009).
1.2 Internationalization of Russian Economy
In this chapter we will try to explain how the Russian economy adjusted to globalization
of markets, and how Russian enterprises responded and adjusted to change and
evolutionary forces and processes in external and internal environment, and what
factors affected the adjustment process.
Despite Russia accounts for the largest outward FDI among BRIC countries, Russian
multinationals have been largely overshadowed by the emergence of Indian and
Chinese MNEs and not sufficiently addressed in the literature.
Trying to understand if the “BRIC” group of countries still exists, which was considered
recently as four economies that are particularly important and promising and whose
rise may transform the world economy (Wilson et al., 2004, cited from Sauvant 2005),
and whether Russia is still a part of this group in terms of general trends and value of
economic performance and OFDI, one should consider the differences between the
individual countries. As the resistance of Brazilian, Chinese and Indian MNEs to the
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downturn of 2008–2009 can more easily be taken for granted than that of Russian
multinationals, the latter are faced with the more challenging environment – both global
and domestic. Nevertheless, almost all emerging MNEs tend to evolve from regional
multinationals to global multinationals (Rugman and Verbeke, 2008; Sethi, 2009).
Nowadays emerging markets show the greatest activity in the field of
internationalization, like Russian market which is considered by most potential entrants
as a huge opportunity. The methods of entry and models of operations of Western and
American MNEs in the Russian market can provide domestic players with starting
solutions toward internationalization.
The Russian economy has experienced a lot of turmoil during the past two decades.
After economic stagnation in the 1980s, the Soviet economic system collapsed
between 1989 and 91. The next decade, Russia’s GDP decreased with 44 percent.
However, the informal sector found a great stimulation by the fall of the communist
regime and therefore the real GDP decline must have been less extensive as noted.
From 1999 on, the situation improved as Russia’s economy grew rapidly with an
average of 7 percent a year and in the past decade Russia has proven to be one of the
big, emerging markets. On top of that, amongst the BRIC countries, the purchasing
power was highest in Russia.
The study of Elenkov (1995) helps to understand roots of internationalization of
Russian economy in the context of the networking of Russian and Western companies
in the military sector. Making joint ventures with Russian aerospace companies,
Western firms had access to state-of-the-art technology, a large number of new
customers, as well as to the services of a relatively inexpensive and highly skilled work
force. Forming strategic alliances with Russian companies, Western firms were able to
significantly reduce the total cost of creating new models. By concluding co-production
agreements with the Russians, Western companies can greatly lower their
procurement and production expenses and even accelerate the development of full-
scale manufacturing of new products. By entering into co-marketing and cross-
licensing agreements with Russian firms, Western companies considerably increased
their revenues (Elenkov 1995).
The Russian aerospace MNEs (which were factually first multinationals based in
Russia) were competing at a world-class level due to manufacturing high-performance
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products, expanding aggressively in foreign markets, and operating at a profit (Elenkov
1995). They have also introduced a new dimension of competition in their industry
which was characterized by aggressive R&D development, effective implementation of
new technology to produce advanced aircrafts and related products and consistency in
keeping the total cost down. All these features are still of dramatic importance for most
of Russian MNEs in various sectors.
Inward FDI of Western MNEs in Russia was mainly based on the following models:
foreign company invests money and seeks transparent projects; foreign investor enters
Russian market with its own project and management and organizes network with local
firms; international company searches for optimal entry mode to enter Russian market.
Besides, Western companies prefer to use the service of the familiar partners while
deciding to establish manufacturing facility in Russia.
MNEs that entered to the Russian market at the beginning of transition processes in
the national economy are now the leaders in their industries. All the risks and
difficulties which these firms have faced during the initial stages have been overcome
and nowadays these companies are profitable.
Those MNEs which reached considerable competitiveness working in Russia
conducted purposeful and consecutive marketing activity. At the heart of the chosen
entry strategies to the Russian market were: orientation to high quality of production
and services; the effective marketing policy adapted for Russia; local partnerships
(Panibratov 2009).
International springboard perspective, provided by Luo and Tung (2007), generalizes
several strategies, undertaken by emerging MNEs:
- cumulative benefits from inward investment before undertaking outward FDI;
- leapfrog trajectory; and
- coopetition with global players.
Taking a look at the recent phenomenon of Russian multinationals we will easily find
traces of these features in their internationalization paths. The companies of emerging
economies countries should explore new foreign markets to insure themselves from
political and economic risks in the countries of origin and to increase profitability. These
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companies could have an advantage over Western competitors applying new
approaches in marketing, HRM, manufacturing technologies and developing unique
projects.
1.3 Previous Research on Outward FDI from Russia: Motives and Destinations
Perspective
Russian MNEs international FDI activities have been examined by Filatotchev (2007b),
Kalotay (2001, 2005, 2005, 2008), Kuznetsov (2010), Liutho (2001, 2005) Liutho and
Jumpponen (2003), Sauvant (2005) and Vahtra and Liutho (2005). The subject of most
research (despite broadly analyzed) was the interest of Russian companies to diversify
their holdings through international investment, the object – more or less constant
range of companies in a couple of industries (predominantly oil and gas, metallurgy,
and telecom).
Outward FDI from Russia are often seen as similar to system escape, when firms
driving outward FDI are investing abroad due to the negative characteristics of the
Russian business environment. Despite this phenomenon was discussed toward MNEs
based in developed economies, where institutional barriers in the home country
express avoidance by firms of political constraints with escape through international
investment (Witt and Lewin 2007, Boddewyn and Brewer 1994), it also applicable to
the case of Russian firms with free cash flow and retained earnings find investing
abroad to provide a higher rate of expected returns (Kalotay 2001).
Nevertheless, the impact of inward FDI as of more economical than political factor to
the Russian MNEs outward investment activity is out of question. The look
(aforementioned in the previous chapters) on the interdependence of inward FDI and
outward FDI may be interesting if compare Russia as a part of CIS region with other
BRIC economies (Brazil, India and China) in the context of South and Central
Americas, South Asia and East Asia regions consequently.
Starting from a relatively low base, the strong FDI inflows into Russia 2006-2008 shows
that the stock of inward FDI became comparable to or even higher than in the other
BRIC countries. According Economist Intelligence Unit (2010), by 2009 the share of the
estimated inward FDI stock in GDP in Russia was similar to the shares in Brazil and
China, traditionally high FDI recipient countries. Russia also had the highest FDI stock
per head among the BRICs (Economist Intelligence Unit 2010)
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As outward FDI from Russia reached $52 billion in 2008, the dominance of Russia in
the CIS region became noticeable; only India dominated in the South Asia region in a
comparable extent (annex table 2).
The recent data on outward FDI is even more impressive. OFDI flows reached
US$10.3bn in the first quarter of 2010, according to the Russian Central Bank (annex
table 3). They amounted to US$46.1bn in 2009. At the same time, over one-half of
outward FDI by non-banking corporations went to offshore (Cyprus, the Netherlands,
Gibraltar, Luxembourg, Switzerland, and the British Virgin Islands) what makes this
part of foreign investments a pseudo-FDI. This may illustrate the reverse to the “capital
flight” related to “system-escape” motives, which decreased sharply after 1999 but
bounced back during the global crisis.
The motives of Russian outward investment vary significantly. It is not surprising that
the most typical motives of Russian investors MNEs are the search for markets and
resources. Besides, some investments are of the strategic-assets-seeking character,
and are rarely efficiency-seeking. Sometimes, OFDI from Russia are driven as well by
image-building motives or domestic political risks prevention considerations (IMEMO-
VCC 2009)
Illustrations of various FDI aims can be seen in top Russian outward deals (annex table
4). For example, Norilsk Nickel and Evraz Group have been trying to broaden their
resource bases, while Lukoil and Alfa Group have been trying to strengthen their
geographical positions in foreign markets, and Basic Element trying to acquire modern
foreign technologies for use in Russia.
Despite some Russian MNEs have affiliates almost all over the world, the effects of the
historical and cultural ties as well as physical proximity are evident in the geographical
distribution of Russian outward investments. This may serve as another explanation of
the focus of Russian OFDI on the CIS region.
The perception of other continents by Russian investors is chaotic. The Latin America
is seen as a far-away underdeveloped region, with institutional barriers such as the
lack of bilateral double taxation and investment treaties. African countries are the terra
incognita for Russian companies. As to India and China – these two are more
understandable by Russian companies and so attract more investments from Russia.
Andrei Panibratov                                                                                    PEI Electronic Publications 15/2010
www.tse.fi/pei
12
The scale and the sectoral distribution of Russian investors are in most cases
explained with the longevity of the companies’ presence in the economy. Successors of
Soviet multinationals can be seen side by side with companies which began their
internationalization only in the past few years.
Russian companies in the oil & gas and metallurgy sectors control the majority of
country’s foreign assets. These industries represent the areas of Russian specialization
in the world economy. However, many other Russian industries have also begun
investing abroad. Companies in machinery, electricity supply, food, transport,
telecommunication, electrical equipment are also to be found amongst the top Russian
investors abroad.
Although nowadays it is mainly the classic MNEs that dominate among leading
Russian multinationals, some companies with significant foreign assets do have
features of other types. There are companies which exploit transnational economic ties
within the old Soviet area ? Inter RAO UES and Gasprom. The steel firms Severstal
and Rusal prefer to invest in the most developed markets but nobody knows exactly
whether they have assets-seeking strategies and intend to transfer new technologies
into their Russian enterprises, or whether their investment is only a new form of capital
escape.
Fluctuation of the geographical priorities of Russian multinationals is also very
interesting (annex table 5). According Kuznetsov (2010), these firms evolve from intra-
regional multinationals (which operate within the CIS area) or bi-regional multinationals
(the CIS plus the European Union) to global multinationals.
The appearance of non-European countries among the most important destinations of
Russian OFDI (for instance, Canada, India, Italy, the United Arab Emirates, and the
USA) shows the progress of Russian companies’ internationalization process which is
discussed in the next chapter.
The post entry strategies of Russian multinationals are often vary from entry decisions.
The explanation of the initial entry decision and the operational strategy will be given in
the following chapter.
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2 ENTRY AND POST ENTRY DECISIONS: EVIDENCE FROM
  INDUSTRIES
2.1 Exporting from Russia: Oil and Gas industry
International companies in oil and gas retain significant influence over the global
energy sector, and they collectively represent some of the largest reserves holders,
extractors, and petrochemical manufacturers operating today. Perhaps more
importantly is that despite certain oil companies are looking to internationalize their
operations either to spread risk or to respond to market factors, the majority of them
are the technology, intellectual-property, and project-management powerhouses of the
whole industry.
A drop of over $100 per barrel in oil prices in the late 2000s to around $32 per barrel
prompted many national oil companies, which depend on oil for most of their revenue,
to cut spending, delay and cancel oil and gas projects. Major national oil companies,
having a planned capex of over $261 billion during 2009, are expected to spend
approximately $540 billion in oil and gas investments over the next five years and to
invest to make their operations more integrated and also expand internationally.
Russian oil and gas companies are typically large, integrated players that benefit
from their scales of operations. The presence of such incumbents intensifies the rivalry.
Due to the fact that oil and gas operations are highly energy and labor intensive fix
costs are also high and market is hard to exit as leaving would require significant
divestments of assets specific to the business.
Russia is a major world oil producer, sometimes producing even more than Saudi
Arabia. Russia’s output rebounded during the early 2000s, but the effects of high
government taxation and a mature field base threaten an overall decline in production.
Russia has proven oil reserves of 60 billion barrels, most of which are located in
Western Siberia, between the Ural Mountains and the Central Siberian Plateau.
Russia’s production growth depends on the availability of viable export routes for the
country’s crude oil. During 2007, Russia exported almost 4.4 million bbl/d of crude oil,
and over 2 million bbl/d of oil products. Roughly 1.3 million bbl/d were exported via the
Druzhba pipeline to Belarus, Ukraine, Germany, Poland, and other destinations in
Central and Eastern Europe (including Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic),
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around 1.3 million bbl/d via the new flagship Primorsk port near St. Petersburg, and
around 900,000 bbl/d via the Black Sea.
Two subchapters will deliver the cases of Gasprom and Lukoil. Two aspects of these
cases are: 1) the export as the entry decision and as the operational mode, and 2) the
role of the State as of the owner and as of ‘just’ stakeholder.
Gazprom is the largest Russian company and one of the world’s leading energy
companies with around 18% of global gas production. The Gazprom Group is also the
world’s leader in natural gas reserves. Its major business lines are the exploration,
production, transportation, storage, processing and marketing of hydrocarbons as well
as the generation and marketing of heat and electric power.
Since the technological specifics of natural gas transport and distribution require
significant investment in export infrastructure, Gazprom was forced to begin its
expansion abroad in the early 1990s. Currently the Group’s main foreign assets are
concentrated in Germany, Ukraine, Poland, Belarus, the Baltic States and some other
European countries. Gazprom has organized several greenfield projects with its
European partners, as well as tried to buy companies in highly profitable distribution
segments also its state connections have often aroused resistance. In the 2000s,
Gazprom started investing abroad in gas exploration and production, beginning with
Central Asia and moving on to Vietnam, Latin America and some Arab countries. A
significant impulse in this business was an exchange of assets with the German firm
BASF (Gazprom received 49% of the famous Wintershall AG). Gazprom also controls
an electric power station in Lithuania (since 2003) and has built a new power-
generating unit in Armenia.
Gazprom uses a wide range of modes when entering a new market. Though licensing
and franchising is not typical in this industry, we can see examples of exporting, turn
key projects joint ventures and wholly owned subsidiaries. Nevertheless the main mode
when entering European or Asian area is exporting, which has a quite low risk, though
it is strongly influenced by the international agreements between governments.
Gazprom’s internationalization process is a really complex topic. Though it is
considered to be a private company, the influence of the government in power has
strong effects in the operation of the company. As we could see in the history, this
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company was transformed from a ministry, its chairman was prime minister and this
position is at the mercy of the all-time president. For example, in December 2008, the
Board of Gazprom Neft and Serbia’s Energy Ministry signed an agreement for a 51%
acquisition of Naftna Industrija Srbije in Moscow. This was in line with the
governmental agreement on cooperation in the oil and gas industry and the
memorandum of agreement of Gazprom Neft’s 51% acquisition of Naftna Industrija
Srbije, which was signed in January 2008.
Currently the state has the controlling share of the company. So it is not a surprise if
we state that a movement taken by Gazprom is always strongly connected to the goals
of the Russians government strategy. Due to these circumstances, the company
instead of focusing on the profitability, has to indulge the needs of the government;
being compared to the size of the company, the internationalization process is in a very
early stage. Otherwise, if we look at Gazprom from the point of view that it has to serve
continuously hundreds of millions of consumers and thousands of key B2B customers,
we should rather consider this company as common good, such as health care and not
as a globally competitive company. Anyway, they have to implement changes in
answer to the problems the company faces.
To summarize we present the main internationalization results of Gazprom in the
exhibit 1.
Exhibit 1. Internationalization of Gazprom
Internationalization started Early 1990s
Main assets abroad Germany, Ukraine, Poland, Belarus, the Baltic States and
some other European countries.
Foreign destinations In the 2000s investments in Central Asia and move on to
Vietnam, Latin America and some Arab countries
Entry modes Exporting (as the main mode), turn key projects, joint ventures
and wholly owned subsidiaries
Major deals and projects An exchange of assets with the German firm BASF (Gazprom
received 49% of the famous Wintershall AG)
Expansion approach Greenfield projects with European partners; acquisition of
companies in highly profitable distribution segments
Role of the state Both formal and non-formal participation of the state in the
company; the strategy is always strongly connected to the
goals of the Russians government
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Lukoil is the largest Russian private oil company. The main activities of the company
are the exploration and production of oil & gas, the production of petroleum products
and petrochemicals, and the marketing of these outputs. Lukoil has around 1.1% of
global oil reserves and 2.3% of global production.
Lukoil began its investment expansion abroad in the middle of the 1990s. Lukoil has
acquired participating interests in the exploration of oil & gas fields or oil production in
Azerbaijan (several projects since 1994), Egypt and Kazakhstan (several projects since
1995), Iraq (1997), Colombia (2002), Iran (2003), Saudi Arabia and Uzbekistan (2004),
Venezuela (2005), Ivory Coast (2006) and Ghana (2007). In 1998, Lukoil started its
expansion in global refinery business with the acquisition of Petrotel in Romania. Then
the company acquired and modernized refineries in Bulgaria and Ukraine (1999). Since
2008, Lukoil has owned two refineries in Italy. It also has petrochemical plants abroad
(in Ukrainian Kalush and Bulgarian Burgas, as well as small plants in Belarus and
Finland). Nearly 70% of Lukoil’s 6,700 petroleum stations are located in 24 foreign
countries, mainly in the United States (1,524 at the end of 2008), Turkey (777), Finland
(456), Romania (319), Ukraine (285), Bulgaria (209), Serbia (184), Belgium (157),
Lithuania (120) and Poland (106).
Compared to its Russian competitors Lukoil has a more market-oriented and profit-
seeking approach. As a result, its internationalization process is more motivated by
economic and strategic reasons than by Russia’s political interests, even though
sometimes these factors overlap.
Lukoil holds a historical position in Russia of the leaders in the field of oil production.
Thanks to the bankruptcy of main rival Yukos, Lukoil managed to affirm its strong
leading position in its home market. This allowed the company to start some years ago
its internationalization process.
Lukoil’s core market remains Russia and to some extent oil-producer CIS countries
despite recent significant moves abroad. The internationalization level of Lukoil’s can
still be considered as low if we compared it to international oil majors (Total, Shell).
Looking at Lukoil’s situation this is easily understandable: the company enjoys strong
leading position in its home market with significant though depleting oil and gas
reserves. However, it is true that if the company does not manage to expand its current
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oilfield basis in Russia by investing in new regions such as Far East, Lukoil will have to
pick up the pace of its internationalization process and focus on securing new oil fields.
Regarding the refining, marketing and distribution segment, Lukoil is likely to keep on
internationalizing by cheap retail acquisitions or franchising and by strategic
partnership such as the joint-venture in Sicily.
It is interesting to notice that Lukoil’s most profitable activities (production and
exploration) are the less internationalized while the less profitable (marketing, refinery)
are already highly internationalized. This means that internationalization is not, in the
oil and gas industry, an absolute requirement for high profit margins.
The main internationalization results of Lukoil are presented in the exhibit 2.
Exhibit 2. Internationalization of Lukoil
Internationalization started The middle of 1990s
Main assets abroad Nearly 70% of Lukoil’s 6,700 petroleum stations are located in
24 foreign countries, mainly in the United States (1,524 at the
end of 2008), Turkey (777), Finland (456), Romania (319),
Ukraine (285), Bulgaria (209), Serbia (184), Belgium (157),
Lithuania (120) and Poland (106)
Foreign destinations Azerbaijan (since 1994), Egypt and Kazakhstan (since 1995),
Iraq (1997), Colombia (2002), Iran (2003), Saudi Arabia and
Uzbekistan (2004), Venezuela (2005), Ivory Coast (2006) and
Ghana (2007)
Entry modes Acquisitions
Major deals and projects The acquisition of Petrotel in Romania in 1998, acquisition and
modernization of refineries in Bulgaria and Ukraine (1999).
Since 2008, Lukoil has owned two refineries in Italy. It also
has petrochemical plants abroad (in Ukrainian Kalush and
Bulgarian Burgas, as well as small plants in Belarus and
Finland)
Expansion approach Market-oriented and profit-seeking approach; cheap retail
acquisitions or franchising, strategic partnerships such as the
joint venture in Sicily
Role of the state Significant as in all energy businesses but not so high as in
case of Gazprom or Rosneft
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2.2 Establishing Partnerships: High Tech Sector
The new economic reality has created the prompt climate for the budding Russian
high tech sector: its particular strength — a well-educated, growing middle class.
When looking at the average GDP growth, the increase of the disposable income is
supporting consumer spending which is mostly used to buy consumer goods. The
Russian software market generated total revenues of $4.5 bn in 2008, representing a
CAGR of 18.6 per cent for the period 2004-2008. Moreover, the Russian digital
economy indicators (PC, internet, broadband penetration rates) have been steadily
growing positively.
The most lucrative business for the Russian software market in 2008 was home use
application software sales, generating total revenues of $1.1 billion, equivalent to 23.6
percent of the market's overall value. The software market performance is anticipated
to grow further with a CAGR of 22.3 percent for the five-year period 2008-2013, which
is expected to drive the market to a value of $12.3 billion by the end of 2013.
Services, financial services and industrials are the segments that concentrated the
larger number of the total demand for which the software industry has been developing
sophisticated solutions. Taking in consideration the extreme volatile industry in Russia
which requires urgently IT systems to remain competitive, Russia is not completely
developed in its IT-segment. The IT demand exploded and even exceeded the supply
in some segments of the IT-market.
Many foreign enterprises have established operations in Russia, demanding the same
quality of services as in their other, often developed Western, markets. This provided
incentives for the local IT enterprises to improve their operations to become potential
service providers for these foreign firms. Approximately 65 percent of the overall IT-
turnover corresponds to the sale of hardware, 22 percent to IT-services and 13 percent
to software. There is a huge growth potential. Remarkable is that the market share of
software in Russia is lower than in other western countries. Some sectors like banking
and finance, telecommunication, big industrial companies and the state (E-
Government) already invest in the improvement of their IT-system whereas numerous
other branches and small and medium-sized companies develop pent-up demand.
Russia has an opportunity of becoming an international outsourcing hub for the high
tech sector, having a number of reasons for foreign businesses to consider Russia as
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an option rather than India or China. The main success factor of the Russian service
industry is primarily determined by a high level of staff education which provides for
better manpower at relative low cost. The ability to deal with non-standard issues
proves the ability to manage high-end, complex projects.  Another factor has been the
growing returns in finding cheaper resources for routine software development. Russia
has proven to have a huge investment potential, with growing sales and a forecasted
CAGR of 20.4 percent for the period of 2007-2011 while IT spending reaching 37 billion
dollars in 2011.
The major factor that affected the Russian software industry in 2008 was the global
financial crisis. The crisis led to some problems in the industry, primarily being the
global decline in the IT market which caused difficulties in the overall demand. In 2008
exports of software and software development services decreased drastically (from
52% to 21%). The export target of 3 billion dollars, set by the Russian IT union Russoft
was not attained, its volume only reaching the level of 2.65 billion dollars.
The disadvantage has turned into an advantage as independence from external
sources of financing enabled high tech firms (especially IT companies) to preserve
stability in these difficult times. In addition, there were some exceptions among
software export businesses as certain companies actually managed to grow during the
toughest months by exporting software products into new markets. It is most likely that
it was the crisis that prompted businesses to proactively promote their solutions in new
countries. Nevertheless, there has emerged a leading group of frontrunners in the IT
service industry that expanded the range of their services and has in such entered the
elite of IT service providers which is successfully coping with competition on the global
market. At the same time, these providers have proven to occupy a niche that major
service providers were not able to offer in the Russian IT industry.
Kaspersky Lab is a Russian computer security company, founded in 1997 in Moscow.
The company is the market leader in the development in anti-virus software. The
company works in the software industry, where it specializes in computer security.
Kaspersky offers anti-spyware, anti-spam, and anti-intrusion products. Its most famous
and most important product is Kaspersky Anti-Virus, which is well praised within the
industry as well as by the customer. The product has won several awards over the
years and has been ranked first in anti-virus software multiple times.
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By the mid 2000s Kaspersky Lab had grown into an international company, employing
over 1500 computer specialists. The company is present all around the globe, in more
than 100 countries. Headquarters are in Moscow and the company has regional offices
in Europe (Netherlands, Germany, France, UK, Poland, Romania, Sweden), Asia
(Japan, China, South Korea) and United States.
Growth the software industry is mostly attained through operational performance
improvements and excellence and technological innovations. In times of crisis, as the
financial downturn of 2009 has hit, the incentives for cost reduction through operational
fine-tuning and cuts on the R&D budget remained high. Nevertheless, while the
majority of businesses in the software industry grow through mergers and acquisitions,
Kaspersky follows a path of organic development. As Kaspersky aims for global
growth, the main strategy remains to be new enterprise-oriented solutions, regional
expansion and increased partners.
Since internet is worldwide, the company operating in this area automatically
establishes its worldwide presence. In order to better serve its customers, Kaspersky
established relationships with distributors in other countries, starting its international
expansion with an export.
The next step was engaging in partnerships in order to conquer the U.S. market. In
2001, Kaspersky Lab announced a partnership with Itamigo, a developer of internet
security services. This enabled the company to launch the first Kaspersky anti-virus
products to the customers in the U.S. market. Exploring partnerships has the
advantage of low costs and a shared risk. This is important for a young company which
is not yet fully established in the market and deals with low capital.
The European market was entered via the launch of European retail sales in 2001. The
company made use of local retail and distribution networks in order to provide its
products to the European market. These developments were followed by opening
regional offices in European countries. In 2003 a regional office in Beijing, China was
opened which was the beginning of its exploration of the less developed markets. After
the company established its presence in the East, it continued to expand into the
African market.
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Kaspersky Lab has established multiple strategic partnerships with the top of the
software industry. Among its strategic partners were Microsoft, Intel, IBM, Novell,
Check Point and Linux Solutions. For Microsoft, Kapersky Lab was a so called Gold
Certified Security Solutions Partner. Furthermore, the two companies were working on
several joint projects. Regarding its partnership with Intel, Kaspersky Lab has
optimized its systems for Intel products.
Internationalization results of Kaspersky Lab are presented in the exhibit 3.
Exhibit 3. Internationalization of Kaspersky Lab
Internationalization started 2001
Foreign destinations / Main
assets abroad
Regional offices in Europe (Netherlands, Germany, France,
UK, Poland, Romania, Sweden), Asia (Japan, China, South
Korea) and United States
Entry modes Starting with an export to establish relationships with
distributors in other countries. Establishment of multiple
strategic partnerships with the top of the software industry
Major deals and projects The launch of European retail sales and partnership with
Itamigo (a US developer of internet security services) in 2001.
Strategic partnerships with Microsoft, Intel, IBM, Novell, Check
Point and Linux Solutions. In 2003 a regional office in Beijing,
China was opened. After the company established its
presence in the East, it continued to expand into the African
market
Expansion approach Opening regional offices in European countries
Role of the state Low
Sitronics is one of the largest national players in the high tech industry. Established in
2002, the company was set up as a scientific center, directed at microelectronics and
telecommunications equipment and software. In 2004, the company established a
business line related to IT-services. The company gained stakes in several companies,
among which the largest IT company in Ukraine (Kvazar-Mirco). Now, Sitronics says to
be the largest high-tech company in Eastern Europe operating in the field of
telecommunications solutions, information technologies, system integration and
consulting, and the development and manufacture of microelectronics products.
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The company is a key partner for the states and governmental bodies in the field of
infrastructural transformations in the Russian Federation and CIS countries. Sitronics
succeeded in implementing strategy of public private partnership, taking part in
scientific research backed up by government.
The company has subsidiaries in over 30 countries and employs over 10,000 people.
Sitronics was ranked as a top 3 Russian IT-company. Major national competitors are
Luxoft, Argussoft and BCC. International competitors are Microsoft, IBM and SAP AG.
Having over 3,500 clients around the globe, the company exports to over 60 countries
in Western and Eastern Europe, Middle East, North America, North Africa and Central
and South-East Asia. Manufacturing is done in Russia, Greece, Czech Republic,
Romania and China. The major enterprises of Sitronics are located in Prague and
Athens for Telecommunications Solutions, in Kiev for IT, and in Zelenograd and
Moscow for Microelectronics Solutions.
Sitronics focuses on telecommunication, information technology and microelectronics
markets in Russia, CIS, Greece, Eastern Europe, Middle East and South-East Africa
(markets with the highest growth rates). The company participates in the range of the
joint projects in the telecommunications area with large international companies – with
Ericsson (3G network designs) and Cisco Systems (network solutions for fixed and
mobile communications).
The expansion strategy of Sitronics is based on strong partnerships with key global and
regional players. Sitronics has developed strategic alliances with Cisco Systems,
STMicroelectronics, Infineon and Giesecke&Devrient in relation to most important
products and services. Sitronics has vendor relationships with Siemens, Ericsson,
Motorola, Oracle, Intel, Sun Microsystems and Microsoft. Key customers are both local
companies (MTS, Comstar-UTS and MTT), and international firms (OTE, Cosmote,
Vodafone, Ericsson, Arcelor Mittal and TCL).
Sitronics uses strategic partnerships and joint venture modes in order to get inside new
attractive markets, enjoying the benefits of the concepts such as established networks
and lower risks. One recent strategic partnership was established with Nokia Siemens
Networks, a global enabler of communications services.  Within the framework of this
partnership, the agreement was signed, according which Sitronics Microelecrtonics
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(subsidiary of Sitronics) became the official global supplier of analogue power
management electronic components for Nokia Siemens Networks products.
The most important international results of Sitronics are presented in the exhibit 4.
Exhibit 4. Internationalization of  Sitronics
Internationalization started Mid 2000s
Foreign destinations Telecommunication, IT and microelectronics markets in CIS,
Greece, Eastern Europe, Middle East and South-East Africa.
The major enterprises are located in Prague and Athens for
Telecommunications Solutions, in Kiev for IT
Main assets abroad Subsidiaries in over 30 countries
Entry modes Strategic partnerships and joint ventures
Major deals and projects Strategic partnership with Nokia Siemens Networks. Joint
projects in the telecommunications area with Ericsson (3G
network designs) and Cisco Systems (network solutions for
fixed and mobile communications). Strategic alliances with
Cisco Systems, STMicroelectronics, Infineon and
Giesecke&Devrient in relation to most important products and
services. Vendor relationships with Siemens, Ericsson,
Motorola, Oracle, Intel, Sun Microsystems and Microsoft.
Expansion approach Exporting to over 60 countries in Western and Eastern
Europe, Middle East, North America, North Africa and Central
and South-East Asia. Manufacturing in Russia, Greece, Czech
Republic, Romania and China. Key customers are both local
companies (MTS, Comstar-UTS and MTT), and international
(OTE, Cosmote, Vodafone, Ericsson, Arcelor Mittal and TCL)
Role of the state Average
2.3 Opening Subsidiaries: Banking Sector
The biggest banks in the industrial world have evidently become complex financial
organizations that offer a wide variety of services to international markets and control
billions of dollars in cash and assets. Supported by the latest technology, banks are
working to identify new business niches, to develop customized services, to implement
innovative strategies and to capture new market opportunities.
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Banks offer five product categories: credit, securities, asset management, financial
services and insurance. Also, five client types can be distinguished that banks can
target: governmental clients (nation states, supranational institutions), corporate clients,
institutional clients (other banks, asset managers and insurers), retail clients and
private clients. The banks which entered new market have actively serviced and
targeted a wide range of clients and products. The deregulation of the world financial
sector led to an increasing convergence between the activities of investment and
commercial banks over the past decade.
The Russian banking landscape was highly fragmented in the end of 2000s. There
has been a rapid increase in banking and financial sector services in Russia during
2000–2008. More than 1,200 banks operated in the country in 2009, and even the
largest privately owned banks held maximum of 4 per cent of the market. In turn, state
owned banks being considered as more reliable and secure, held about 50 per cent of
the market, despite perceived to be somewhat inert and overly bureaucratic.
In 2008, the share of the top 200 banks in terms of asset volume reached 93.9% of
total banking sector assets, and the share of the top five banks was 46.2% as of
January 1, 2009. The proportion of the market held by the top 10 banks has remained
more or less constant for several years, with the big state-owned banks (Sberbank,
VTB and Gazprombank) having dominant positions. The proportion of the market
controlled by foreign banks was less than 10%. Despite significant increase since 2006
it remains relatively low by comparison with other emerging markets (the average in
Central and Eastern Europe is closer to 70%).
Technologies in Russian banking sector were somewhat simplistic, with corporate
loans usually extended against collateral rather than against forecast cash flows. Fee-
based products played a negligible role, rendering many Russian banks overly
dependent on interest and trading income. Also, most banks were organized by region
rather than by business segment, which sometimes led to an insufficient focus on the
customer.
Gaps as described above provide substantial opportunities for big foreign banks whose
funding, brand reputation, product expertise, customer service skills, and risk
management experience are often superior to those of their Russian counterparts. The
latter find it easier to start international expansion with opening subsidiaries in the
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neighboring CIS countries. The cases of Alfa bank and VTB present the subsidiaries as
the vehicle of entry and of operations’ expansion consequently.
Alfa-Bank is the part of Alfa Group – the Russian largest privately owned financial-
industrial conglomerate, with interests in oil and gas, commercial and investment
banking, asset management, insurance, retail trade, telecommunications, media, water
supply and water disposal, as well as other industrial-trade and special-cases
investments.
The corporate and retail client base of the bank has grown considerably during the last
several years — by September 1, 2009 Alfa-Bank Russia served over 55,000 corporate
and 3.6 million retail customers, while the branch network has been extended to 341
offices across Russia and abroad, including a subsidiary bank in the Netherlands and
financial subsidiaries in the United States and the UK.
Alfa-Bank has more than 200 branches in Russia and the CIS, and subsidiaries in
Kazakhstan, the Netherlands, and the United States. The company’s CIS branch
network services corporate and retail clients in commercial and investment banking.
The bank typically makes investments if can have the majority of the shares or an
equal control or significant influence under. As the company typically holds controlling
stakes in the companies in which it invests, any planned exit strategy is tenuous.
Foreign investors provide the bank with not only capital, but also the expertise which is
needed to successfully develop and realize the bank’s investment projects.
Alfa Bank has expanded its commercial operations in Ukraine and, on a smaller scale,
in Kazakhstan. Currently, Alfa Bank has a subsidiary bank in Kiev, with three branches
in Kiev, including its head office, and three regional branches in Ukraine. Alfa Group
takes a more conservative approach to Kazakhstan, where it currently has one
subsidiary in Almaty with branches in Astana, Karaganda and Ust-Kamenogorsk.
The international results of Alfa Bank can be viewed through the exhibit 5.
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Exhibit 5. Internationalization of Alfa Bank
Internationalization started Mid 1990s
Foreign destinations Mainly CIS
Main assets abroad Branches in the CIS, subsidiaries in Kazakhstan, the
Netherlands, the UK, and the United States
Entry modes Investments if can have the majority of the shares or an equal
control or significant influence under. Typically holds
controlling stakes in the companies in which it invests
Major deals and projects A subsidiary bank in Kiev, with three branches in Kiev,
including its head office, and three regional branches in
Ukraine. Focus on Kazakhstan (one subsidiary in Almaty with
branches in Astana, Karaganda and Ust-Kamenogorsk)
Expansion approach Expansion in Ukraine and in Kazakhstan. Opening branches
and subsidiaries. Quite a conservative approach to expansion
Role of the state Relatively low
The VTB Group has developed over the past two decades into a universal financial
and banking institution with a leading position in Russia and a constantly expanding
presence in the CIS, Western Europe, Africa and Asia, both through organic growth
and a series of strategic acquisitions.
VTB holds a secure second place in Russia in terms of assets, capital, funding base,
corporate and retail lending, with authorized capital Rub bn.104.6 (around 3.6 bn. US
dollars). As of October 01, 2009, VTB’s equity reached RUB 583.8 bn., and its assets
— RUB 2,696.5 bn. (around 93 US dollars). According to 2008 results, the VTB was
placed the 70th among the world’s largest banks.
As of October 01, 2009, the bank’s corporate loan portfolio exceeded RUB 1,541
billion. Loans to construction, metallurgy, machine building and trade enterprises as
well as fuel and energy complex account for the largest part of VTB portfolio.
VTB has two subsidiary banks in Russia, a number of financial companies (VTB
Leasing, VTB Insurance, VTB Capital, etc.), subsidiary banks in Ukraine, Armenia,
Georgia, Belarus and Azerbaijan, as well as six banks in Western Europe (Great
Britain, France, Austria, Germany, Cyprus and Switzerland), a subsidiary bank in
Angola and a financial company in Namibia. VTB Bank also has representative offices
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in Italy, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic and China. VTB Capital plc (United Kingdom)
operates a subsidiary in Singapore.
In general the presence of Russian banks abroad is rather limited, in comparison to
their foreign counterparts. It can be explained with the fact that Russian banks tend to
go abroad mainly to service the investment projects of Russian companies, that are
mainly exporters. This principle is especially true for the CIS region, where the
presence of VTB is the most active in the countries that have larger trade turnover with
Russia. Furthermore, the economic reforms made in those countries also become a
particularly important factor for the internationalization of Russian banks in CIS
countries.
VTB, being a state owned bank, has got some of its banking assets abroad with the
help of the government. For example, 85% of Donau - Bank in Vienna, originally
controlled by Central Bank of Russia, were transferred to the VTB bank. While
implementing its strategic plan to develop the banking network abroad, VTB founded
Russian Commercial Bank in Zurich (Switzerland) and established Russian
Commercial Bank in Limassol (Cyprus).
Later on, VTB became a shareholder of East-West United Bank (Luxembourg) and
Ost-West Handelsbank (Frankfurt-am-Main), and increased its participation in Donau-
Bank (Vienna). The planned acquisitions of European banks by VTB can have
important implications for foreign direct investment into Russia that is why VTB
expansion plans in Europe are usually supported by the government. At the same time,
VTB continues to consolidate its Western Europe subsidiaries.
VTB was the first Russian bank to obtain a license to carry out banking activities in
India and China and to open its branches in these two countries. Besides, taking an
active part in developing trade and economic relations between Russia and China, the
Bank started servicing bank cards of UnionPay, Chinese national processing company.
We summarized the internationalization results of VTB in the exhibit 6.
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Exhibit 6. Internationalization of VTB
Internationalization started Since 2005
Foreign destinations CIS, Western Europe, and also Angola, Singapore, and
Namibia. Interest to Italy and China
Main assets abroad Subsidiary banks in Ukraine, Armenia, Georgia, Belarus and
Azerbaijan; banks in Great Britain, France, Austria, Germany,
Cyprus and Switzerland, also two banks in Angola and
Singapore, and a financial company in Namibia.
Representative offices in Italy, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic
and China
Entry modes Establishing subsidiaries
Major deals and projects The first Russian bank to obtain a license to carry out banking
activities and to open its branches in India and China.
Servicing UnionPay bank cards, Chinese processing
company.
85% of Donau - Bank in Vienna, originally controlled by
Central Bank of Russia, were transferred to the VTB bank.
While implementing its strategic plan to develop the banking
network abroad, VTB founded Russian Commercial Bank in
Zurich (Switzerland) and established Russian Commercial
Bank in Limassol (Cyprus)
Expansion approach Expanding presence in the CIS, Western Europe, Africa and
Asia, both through organic growth and a series of strategic
acquisitions. Most active in the countries that have larger trade
turnover with Russia
Role of the state A state owned bank. Expansion plans in Europe are usually
supported by the government. Has got some of its banking
assets abroad with the help of the government
2.4 FDI from Russia: Metallurgy Sector
In the beginning of 21st century, the metallurgy went through some truly golden years,
as the prices of almost all natural resources grew at a rapid pace. Construction,
especially in developing countries, boomed and the capacity of the industry could
barely satisfy the demand, even though the metal prices were at all time highs. As the
world economy has faced a drastic slowdown since 2007, also the highly cyclical
metallurgy sector has had to accustom its operations to the decreased demand in the
western countries.
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Some of the metallurgy companies have diversified their operations more vertically, so
they can own stakes in mining companies, or they might produce some construction
materials, but for all the companies, the production and refining of metals remains the
core of their business.
Due to the high capital- and investment requirements and high competition, the entry
barriers to enter the markets are very high. Also the scale advantages of big
companies make it difficult for small companies to enter the markets for both ferrous
and non-ferrous metals.
The largest metallurgy player in the world is the Arcelor Mittal, which produces almost
three times more steel than its closest competitor Nippon Steel does. Arcelor Mittal is
even in the worlds scale a huge producer, since in 2008 it accounted for almost 8% of
worlds steel production. The other top 10 producers account for only some 2-3 % of
worlds total output. The largest Russian steel producer is Severstal, which produced
some 17.3 million tons of crude steel in 2008. Other major Russian steel producers are
Evraz, Magnitogorsk and Novolipetsk, all of which belong to the top 25 producers of the
world.
Russian steel companies tend more and more to operate internationally and in the
most of the cases they choose acquisitions as a mode of entry. There are no
monopolistic players, but those which were enumerated previously possess the biggest
share of the market. Only four companies (Severstal, Evraz, Novilipezk, Magnitogorsk)
produced 75% of the whole steel production volume in Russia in 2007.
Russia’s steel industry is characterized by an extremely high degree of concentration:
nine metallurgical companies account for nearly 90% of the country’s steel output,
while the remaining two dozen account for the rest.
The aluminum market will be also considered in this chapter as one of the largest
world companies and Russian MNE – Rusal – operates on it. There is a striking
geographical differentiation on this market. Asia-Pacific region can be named as the
most lucrative region, generating 48.5% of the global aluminum market's aggregate
value. Europe accounts for 25.3% of the global aluminum market, while America owns
26.2%. The main factor of differentiation is the availability of bauxites. There are only
seven bauxite-rich areas: Western and Central Africa (mostly, Guinea), South America
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(Brazil, Venezuela, and Suriname), the Caribbean (Jamaica), Oceania and Southern
Asia (Australia, India), China, the Mediterranean (Greece, Turkey) and the Urals
(Russia).
There is a strong tendency towards integration in the metals and mining industry and in
the aluminum industry as well. Cross-border mergers and acquisitions have been
taking place for several years. Usually the attention during these mergers is focused on
technological improvements and creation of the new products. Also through integration,
companies tend to strengthen their position, lower production costs, and expand
towards new markets.
The aluminum industry is highly concentrated and is represented by a limited number
of large, multinational players offering similar products and services. As a result it
becomes very hard and even impossible for smaller and weaker companies to enter
the market. Also exit barriers are high, because many of the major tangible assets are
highly specific to their industry, and thus harder to divest. And of course it requires a
high concentration of the capital and know-how to enter it. In this situation, players are
strongly motivated to remain in the industry even when conditions are difficult as we
can see it during the crisis.
One of the most striking examples of high consolidation in the Russian industry is the
fact that today there is only one big company in the industry – UC Rusal. Before the
merger of two companies in 2007, there were two main rivals in the Russian aluminum
industry – Sual (about 25% of the market) and Rusal (75% of the market). In 2006
SUAL was in the list of 10 biggest aluminum companies. Its primary specialization was
bauxite production, while Rusal strategic direction for future development was primary
aluminum.
Severstal is the largest Russian vertically-integrated company and is placed among
the top 15 in the world in steel production. In addition to steel and rolled metal,
Severstal also produces coal and non-ferrous metal products. The company was
founded in 1993 on the basis of the privatization of the largest Soviet steel mills
working since 1955.
Severstal began its investment expansion outside Russia in the early 2000s, starting
with the key market of the United States in 2004. Its foreign affiliates produce mostly
Andrei Panibratov                                                                                    PEI Electronic Publications 15/2010
www.tse.fi/pei
31
steel and rolled metal. Severstal has been trying to broaden its activities in the mid
2000s through foreign enterprises in the coal industry and the non-ferrous metal
industry. The company placed its production facilities in the US, Italy, France, the UK,
Poland, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and also Liberia, Burkina Faso and some other countries.
Internationalization of Severstal has begun in 2003 when the company acquired Rouge
Steel, an integrated steel-making facility based in Michigan, USA, for $360 million. This
company was later renamed in Severstal Dearborn. This acquisition was successful
and lead to further expansion of Severstal. Severstal followed an aggressive
internationalization strategy and has planned to acquire several steel producers in the
CIS countries, Europe and North America. In 2006 the company had acquired the
Lucchini Group, bankrupt steel producer with integrated steel-making facilities based in
Italy and France. In 2007 Severstal acquired Celtic Resources, a gold mining company
with a number of assets in Kazakhstan, to broaden the division of Severstal Resources.
Since 2008 international expansion of Severstal turned to be aggressive. Only in 2008
Severstal acquired seven enterprises: Sparrows Point based in Maryland, USA; African
Iron Ore Group Ltd (AIOG) in western Africa; PBS Coals, a coking coal producer based
in Pennsylvania, USA; Balazhal, an East Kazakhstan-based gold mining company;
Esmark Incorporated based in West Virginia, later renamed Severstal Wheeling; WCI
based in Ohio, USA, later renamed Severstal Warren; 53% stake in High River Gold,
the owner of a number of plants and Buryatia and Amur Region and a gold mine in
Burkina Faso (Africa).
One of the exceptions from massive acquisition strategy implemented by Severstal was
a launch of SeverCorr mini-mill in Mississippi, USA, and later renamed Severstal
Columbus.
Among few M&A failures in the history of internationalization of Severstal an attempt to
merge with Arcelor was. This deal could lead to the creation of the biggest enterprise in
world steel industry. Arcelor was involved soon in another more profitable agreement
with Mittal Steel company.
The strategy of acquisition of low performing enterprises in the strategic western
markets (like US and EU) provided Severstal with the opportunity to increase the
capacity and gain market access through local production and distribution outlets. The
internationalization strategy of Severstal thus contradicts that of many other Russian
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MNCs which have started their expansion from the neighboring CIS markets. Instead,
Severstal followed an aggressive expansion strategy in developed markets through
acquisitions.
The main international achievements of Severstal are in the exhibit 7.
Rusal is the largest world producer of aluminum (11% of world production) and
alumina (13%). The company has approximately 75,000 employees. A set of foreign
metal enterprises was developed in the early 2000s through the acquisition of assets in
Armenia, Guinea, Rumania and Ukraine. Later foreign projects included enterprises in
transport machinery (the UK and Canada) and construction (Austria and Switzerland).
Its expansion of 2006-2007 was interrupted by the world crisis, as a result of which the
conglomerate turned down several acquisition prospects.
The company operates in 19 countries, possessing enterprises in Australia, Guyana,
Mongolia, Nigeria, Sweden, Jamaica, and some other countries. The company
primarily operates in Russia, the US, China, Japan and Singapore. The automotive,
construction and packaging industries are key consumers of Rusal’s products.
Except aluminum and alumina businesses Rusal also comprises such assets as
bauxite and nepheline ore mines, cathouse business for production of alloys, foil mills
and production of packaging materials as well as power-generating assets. Generally
six business divisions can be divided: aluminum, alumina, packaging, raw materials,
energy, and engineering and construction.
One of the priority destinations for Rusal is Guinea, where the company is represented
by three production facilities, acquiring them in the period of 2001-2006.
Rusal use the M&A for foreign expansion usually, however, the company avoids a
hostile deals, trying to make agreements and compromises with the partners. Except
M&As, Rusal  also exploit licensing as in the case of Compagnie des Bauxites de
Kindia. And of course export is definitely important for Rusal, accounting some 80% of
the whole company’s output.
The main international results of Rusal are presented in the exhibit 8.
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Exhibit 7. Internationalization of Severstal
Internationalization started 2003
Foreign destinations / Main
assets abroad
Production facilities in the US, Italy, France, the UK, Poland,
Ukraine, Kazakhstan and also Liberia, Burkina Faso and some
other countries
Entry modes Acquisitions
Major deals and projects Acquisition in 2003 of Rouge Steel, an integrated steel-making
facility based in Michigan, USA, for $360 million (was later
renamed in Severstal Dearborn). Acquisition in 2006 of the
Lucchini Group, bankrupt steel producer with integrated steel-
making facilities based in Italy and France. Acquisition in 2007
of Celtic Resources, a gold mining company with a number of
assets in Kazakhstan, to broaden the division of Severstal
Resources. Acquisition of seven enterprises in 2008:
Sparrows Point based in Maryland, USA; African Iron Ore
Group Ltd (AIOG) in western Africa; PBS Coals, a coking coal
producer based in Pennsylvania, USA; Balazhal, an East
Kazakhstan-based gold mining company; Esmark
Incorporated based in West Virginia, later renamed Severstal
Wheeling; WCI based in Ohio, USA, later renamed Severstal
Warren; 53% stake in High River Gold, the owner of a number
of plants and Buryatia and Amur Region and a gold mine in
Burkina Faso (Africa)
Expansion approach An aggressive acquisitions strategy in the CIS countries,
Europe and North America. Since 2008 international
expansion of Severstal turned to be even more aggressive.
The strategy of acquisition of low performing enterprises in the
strategic western markets (like US and EU) provided Severstal
with the opportunity to increase the capacity and gain market
access through local production and distribution outlets. The
internationalization strategy of Severstal thus contradicts that
of many other Russian MNCs which have started their
expansion from the neighboring CIS markets. Instead,
Severstal followed an aggressive expansion strategy in
developed markets through acquisitions.
One of the exceptions from massive acquisition strategy
implemented by Severstal was a launch of SeverCorr mini-mill
in Mississippi, USA, and later renamed Severstal Columbus
Role of the state Relatively low vs an average role in the whole sector
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Exhibit 8. Internationalization of Rusal
Internationalization started Early 2000s
Foreign destinations / Main
assets abroad
Primarily operates in the US, China, Japan and Singapore.
Enterprises in 19 countries (incl. Australia, Guyana, Mongolia,
Nigeria, Sweden, Jamaica).
Entry modes Acquisitions of assets in Armenia, Guinea, Rumania and
Ukraine. Entry into related sectors enterprises in transport
machinery (the UK and Canada) and construction (Austria and
Switzerland).
Major deals and projects Guinea is the priority destinations, where Rusal is represented
by three production facilities, acquiring them within 2001-2006
Expansion approach Rusal uses the M&A for foreign expansion usually; however,
the company avoids hostile deals, trying to make agreements
and compromises with the partners. Rusal also exploit
licensing. Export remains important, accounting for some 80%
of the company’s output
Role of the state Average to high, taking into account positive attitude of the
government to Rusal owners
2.5 Mergers and Acquisitions: Telecom Industry
The telecommunication services industry consists of fixed line telecom services and
alternative carriers. Growth rates in the industry dipped in 2003 but have since returned
to a state of buoyancy as the telecommunication needs of the emerging economies
boosted revenues. The global diversified telecommunication services industry
generated total revenues of $808.5 billion in 2006, this representing a CAGR of 5.1%
for the five-year period spanning 2002-2006.
In recent years the markets of the developed world have been driven by broadband
subscriptions, within the US alone there were over 40 million households and firms
subscribed to a broadband connection. The Asia-Pacific market was increasing in
importance due to the rapidly expanding economics of the NICs, China and India. Asia
Pacific had the second largest market, with combined revenues of approximately $250
billion.
The established players in the global diversified telecommunications industry included
Verizon, AT&T, Sprint Nextel, Bell South Corp and Qwest Communications; together
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they accounted for more than 20% of the industry's overall revenues. Two factors have
affected profitability within the telecom sector in the 2000s: the global economic
downturn since 2001 and industry over-investment in broadband technology.
Three large and powerful international alliances of national telecom operators, namely
Unisource/WorldPartners, Global One and Concert Communications, were initiated in
the middle of 1990s to service international telecom connections and new international
need of multinationals.
Nowadays the share of these big players is really huge in the global market. The high
share can be explained by the individual member corporations of these alliances that
include some of the biggest providers of international connections at the time like
AT&T, Deutsche Telekom and France Telecom and therefore doesn’t primarily stem
from new customer acquisitions made by the alliances themselves.
The Russian telecommunications and technology sector has recorded extremely
buoyant growth in recent years, with penetration of mobile telephones, personal
computers (PCs) and the Internet all expanding rapidly. This growth has been fuelled
by initially low penetration levels, combined with strong growth in economic indicators,
including real disposable incomes.
Few industries have reflected the consumer boom and growing middle class
experienced by Russia in the pre-crisis years as much as telecoms. Total telecom
sector revenue amounted to US$42.6bn in 2008—up from just over US$27bn in 2006.
The mobile market accounted for 57% of the market, or US$24.2bn, and the fixed-line
market accounted for the remaining 43%, or US$18.4bn. The share of the fixed-line
segment in the total telecoms market has fallen in recent years, owing to relatively
slower growth than in mobile telephony.
Mobile telephony has experienced explosive growth in Russia in 2000s, and the market
was the fourth-largest in the world in 2008-2009, after China, India and the US. It has
been one of the most attractive sectors for Russian and foreign investors.
MTS is the largest mobile communications services company in Russia. The company
began its foreign expansion in 2002 establishing a subsidiary in Belarus. Nowadays
MTS has subsidiaries in five CIS countries – in Belarus, Ukraine (since 2003),
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Uzbekistan (2004), Turkmenistan (2005) and Armenia (2007). In 2007, MTS started its
mobile telephone business in India, where it took over Shyam Telelink.
MTS started its internationalization in several neighboring CIS countries. The main
reasons for choosing these target markets were related to historical and cultural
traditions, common infrastructure network inherited from the Soviet era, and relatively
similar business practices. In addition to that one should take under consideration the
geographical proximity, which clearly favored international expansion. Meanwhile,
several target markets of the company (like Uzbekistan) are located relatively far from
main Russian economic centers.
Despite all the difficulties, political relations between and within CIS countries tend to
develop positively. Integration within the CIS seems to be a priority political target for
Russia. Considering the significant role of the state in the mobile communications
sector, this political issue favors co-operation, helps Russian companies to enter new
markets. This plays especially important role in cases of Belarus, Uzbekistan and
Turkmenistan. Moreover, internationalization via expansion to CIS countries fits the
'follow your consumer' strategy of the company. Many Russian firms being MTS
corporate clients have already entered markets of CIS countries and actively develop
economic co-operation in this area. Human migration within the CIS is also an
important reason, as it formed an initial basis as well as incentive for
internationalization by enhancing co-operation between mobile operators from Russia
and other CIS countries (supplying international roaming services).
The internationalization of MTS can be viewed through the exhibit 9.
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Exhibit 9. Internationalization of MTS
Internationalization started In 2002 with establishing a subsidiary in Belarus
Foreign destinations CIS countries and India
Main assets abroad Subsidiaries in Belarus, Ukraine (since 2003), Uzbekistan
(2004), Turkmenistan (2005) and Armenia (2007).
Entry modes Acquisitions of market leaders; the only exception is the joint-
venture in Belarus
Major deals and projects In 2007, MTS started its mobile telephone business in India,
where it took over Shyam Telelink
Expansion approach The 'follow your consumer' strategy. Russian firms being MTS
corporate clients have already entered CIS markets and
actively develop economic co-operation in this area
Role of the state The political factor favored co-operation, and helped to enter
new markets, being especially important in cases of Belarus,
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan
VimpelCom is the leading Russian company in the field of mobile communications,
with over a quarter of the national market. VimpelCom Group provides voice and data
services through a range of mobile, fixed and broadband technologies under the
Beeline brand.
International expansion of the company began with the acquisition of large stakes by
Norwegian Telenor (in 1998) and Russian Alfa-Group in 2001. Currently, VimpelCom
has 30% and 44% of shares respectively. Companies of the VimpelCom Group operats
in Kazakhstan (since 2004, with 43% of the national market), Ukraine and Tajikistan
(since 2005), Uzbekistan, Georgia and Armenia (since 2006), and Vietnam and
Cambodia (since 2008).
In the internationalization process of VimpelCom, acquisitions always played the most
important role. First it acquired the Kazakhstan mobile operator Kar-Tel in 2004.
In the end of 2000s the outlook of the company turned to Asia where it strived to build
mobile networks: in 2008 it established a joint venture GTEL-Mobile in Vietnam in
which it gained a 40% stake, and acquired a 90% stake in Sotelco in Cambodia.
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In Russia, the market penetration was already at 136% level, and the average revenue
per user can be raised hardly. On the contrary, the market penetration in Cambodia
and Vietnam with the total population of 100 million people amounted just to 55%.
Apart from that, the company had also focused its resources on the CIS countries
where the mobile coverage was still at a relatively low level and that could represent
the right space for the future expansion.
As the mobile markets have already been tapped by Russian operators in most of the
CIS countries and Russian mobile operators have started expanding into the domestic
fixed-line and broadband markets, this area could become the busiest in the M&A
arena in the CIS in the near future. This might, however, be true only for those
countries with high population densities, whereas in countries with low densities
operators will prefer to develop the next generation of mobile services, which will allow
them to offer high-speed mobile broadband.
Exhibit 10 presents the main international results of VimpelCom
Exhibit 10. Internationalization of VimpelCom
Internationalization started In 1998 with the acquisition of the 30% stake of Norwegian
Telenor
Foreign destinations / Main
assets abroad
Operates in Kazakhstan (since 2004, with 43% of the national
market), Ukraine and Tajikistan (since 2005), Uzbekistan,
Georgia and Armenia (since 2006), and Vietnam and
Cambodia (since 2008)
Entry modes Mainly acquisitions, but also IJV and licensing
Major deals and projects Focus on Asia with the strive to build mobile networks: in 2008
it established a joint venture GTEL-Mobile in Vietnam in which
it gained a 40% stake, and acquired a 90% stake in Sotelco in
Cambodia. Investment in Laos was made in 2009
Expansion approach Intentions to go global in a various forms not only to CIS
countries but even further to Asia and Europe
Role of the state Despite the telecommunication industry is highly regulated by
the Russian government, VimpelCom has less support but
also less interference in its business
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3 BOUNDARIES AND PROSPECTS OF RUSSIAN MNES
3.1 Born for Global Business
This chapter will explain the process of rise of Russian companies that were
established as international by nature. In one case this is the distributor of the largest
state monopoly in the power generation sector which was finally transformed into the
MNC. The second firm is global ‘from scratch’ as this is the internet company engaged
in the search system and context advertisement businesses.
The electricity sector was under the process of dramatic changes in the mid 2000s in
Russia. The idea of reforming has evolved directly from the answer to some very
simple and evident questions: who pays, how much, to whom and for what? Today
there is a number of regional energy companies and large federal power stations, as
well as the intersystem of electrical grids. The State owns a controlling stake in most
companies, regulating all the activities of the energy entities and determining the prices
of its services and production.
The contemporary economic system in the electricity sector does not satisfy the needs
of any of its participants. The average consumer is unhappy with the fact that every
year they have to pay more and more for electricity, but even this does not guarantee a
safe and stable energy supply. Looking for whose fault this is inevitably leads to
blaming a regional energy company, who in turn point to regional authorities and their
energy commissions for setting unrealistic tariffs to keep favor with the electorate. The
authorities for their part tend to blame the regional energy system, pointing out that it
always asks for too much money and spends it irrationally. This may sound somewhat
odd, but both parties are in fact correct. It is true that the tariff, set by the regional
energy commission, does not cover all the expenses of the regional energy companies,
many of which lack the funds to keep the system in a working state. However, it is also
true that regional energy systems are not motivated to reduce their costs.
What can change the situation in the electricity sector and improve performance of the
local companies is the internationalization of supply. The electricity from Russia is
historically distributed internationally and can promote the development of the industry
as well.
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Inter RAO UES was established as a power distributor of the RAO UES Group in
1997. RAO UES (Unified Energy System of Russia) is a power holding company
engaged in the generation, dispatching, transmission, and retailing of electricity and
heat. RAO UES primarily operates in Russia and employs about 470,000 people. After
the reorganization of the company, the original RAO UES seized to exist, and several
smaller electricity companies were formed. Inter RAO UES succeed a considerable
part of original company's assets and get a notable market share.
In 2001, Inter RAO UES started projects of trading with non-Russian electric power in
foreign markets. In 2002, it began exporting of electric power from Russia as well as
generating power in Russia. In 2003, 40% of the company’s shares were sold to
another Russian energy company Rosenergoatom. As a result, Inter RAO UES
became a unified export and import operator of two of the largest producers of electric
power in the country.
Inter RAO UES started active purchasing of electric power assets abroad with
expansion in Georgia and Armenia in 2003. In 2004, its subsidiary trading company
became one of the major business entities in Finland. In 2005, Inter RAO UES
acquired control over power stations in Moldova and Kazakhstan, began building a
power station in Tajikistan and started operate in Turkey. In 2007, the company took
over a distributor of electricity in Lithuania.
In the end of 2000s Inter RAO UES headed a group of more than 20 companies based
in 14 countries. By acquiring foreign assets, the company consolidated its position in
the electric power markets in Europe, the South Caucasus, the Far East and Central
Asia.
The main export destinations in 2008 were Finland, Belarus and Kazakhstan: they
accounted for more than 73% of all company exports (51.2%, 11.6% and 10.7%,
respectively). Electric power was also supplied to Azerbaijan, Georgia, Ukraine, Latvia,
Lithuania, Mongolia and Norway.
In 2008 the overall imports of electric power under Inter RAO UES contracts totaled
3.05 billion kWh, which was 2.57 billion kWh less than in 2007. The main sources of
electricity imports in 2008 were energy systems of Kazakhstan, Georgia and
Andrei Panibratov                                                                                    PEI Electronic Publications 15/2010
www.tse.fi/pei
41
Azerbaijan, which together accounted for 96.1% of imports (70.9%, 14.2% and 11% of
imports, respectively).
In 2009 Inter RAO UES joined a $1 bn. investment pool with the Russian state owned
VTB bank, and Kuwait's Alghanim & Sons to invest in electricity projects in Russia, the
CIS and Arab countries. It was also bidding in partnership with Rosatom for a contract
to build a nuclear power plant in Turkey.
Competition is very strong in the area of energy sales: some distributors work in every
region, others specialize in one of the consumer groups. They compete by lowering the
price of their services and offering more profitable and convenient conditions of energy
supply.
The reform of the electricity sector signifies an immense change in the Russian
mentality. The success of the reform will mainly depend on the clear understanding of
the idea that energy is not a social good but a good that has to be paid for, and that
electricity is a sector of the national economy that requires a pragmatic attitude and not
political intrigues.
Exhibit 11 contains the main international results of Inter RAO UES
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Exhibit 11. Internationalization of Inter RAO UES
Internationalization started In 2001 with trading by electric power in foreign markets
Main assets abroad Starting with the purchasing of electric power assets abroad
focusing on Georgia and Armenia since 2003, the group has
more than 20 companies in 14 countries
Foreign destinations Finland, Belarus and Kazakhstan accounted for more than
73% of all company exports in 2008. Electric power was also
supplied to Azerbaijan, Georgia, Ukraine, Latvia, Lithuania,
Mongolia and Norway
Entry modes Export, acquisitions, greenfield
Major deals and projects Subsidiary trading company in Finland establishment in 2004.
In 2005, acquisition of control over power stations in Moldova
and Kazakhstan, began building a power station in Tajikistan
and started operate in Turkey. In 2007, the company took over
a distributor of electricity in Lithuania
Expansion approach By acquiring foreign assets, the company consolidated its
position in the electric power markets in Europe, the South
Caucasus, the Far East and Central Asia
Role of the state In 2009 Inter RAO UES joined a $1 bn. investment pool with
the Russian state owned VTB bank, and Kuwait's Alghanim &
Sons to invest in electricity projects in Russia, the CIS and
Arab countries. It was also bidding in partnership with
Rosatom for a contract to build a nuclear power plant in
Turkey
The internet market in Russia was growing fast in the 2000s. In 2003, only 3% of the
Russian population was accessing the web daily – in 2008 it was at the 10% mark.
It was predicted in the end of 2000s that by the end of the century Russia will be the
second largest Internet market in Europe (with Germany no.1), with more than 40
million Internet users. Russia was also predicted to have more than 40% of its
population using the Web by 2012, up 70% from the 2007 level.
The majority of Internet users live in two largest cities of Russia (Moscow and St.
Petersburg) which are where the most affluent Russians live and where 90% of
government spending is plowed.
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There are still a few hurdles Russia has to clear to become a really viable online
economy. The first relates to delivery - freight services can be very unreliable. The
Russian banking system is not as good as the West's yet and Internet users with credit
cards aren't at the levels of the USA; but that is rapidly changing too.
Yandex is the leading internet engine and one of best known brands in Russia with
more than 15 million visitors and users.
On Russian market Yandex is a pioneer in a context advertisement. After the launch of
this product in 2004 it skyrocketed by its share in all advertisement sector. In 2005
revenue from advertisement services of Yandex was $100 million 80% out of which
was revenue from context advertisement. Yandex’s major competitor in this field
remains Google which has tremendous worldwide experience and client base.
Yandex like any other Internet company is international from scratch - it is an
advantage given from the nature of the Internet company itself. The only physical
international asset of Yandex is its subsidiary company Yandex Labs that was founded
in 2009 in the Silicon Valley in California but it is used for research and not to provide
services in the USA.
Yandex’s innovation on the market was an introduction of “pay per click” system, where
a client pays per every entry to the website through Yandex search engine. In this case
client is paying regardless of a fact if a visitor bought anything or not.
During 2009 two domains were opened: in Ukraine (yandex.ua) and in Kazakhstan
(yandex.kz). Both domains are working on Russian language basis, but are
geographically reoriented on Ukraine and Kazakhstan in keyword search processes.
Internet market of Belorussia and Poland were considered as next important targets of
Yandex. Most of the population of Belarus speaks Russian and uses it in daily life
(along with Byelorussian). As to the Poland, many obstacles are expected. The entire
population of Poland uses predominantly only polish language, and very little of them
know Russian language. Besides, the aversion to all Russia-related things is still
noticeable in the country. Moreover, Yahoo and Google are very strong on this market.
Both companies have their domains in Poland running in Polish language.
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Western markets are highly attractive for internet companies as they can be easily
entered without any significant spending on facilities or labor force. At the same time,
they are extremely competitive for all host firms. Though, the meaning of entry barriers
in the case of internet industry is changing comparing with the more ‘physical’ sectors.
Despite Yandex managed to open its subsidiary in USA, it was only for a mere support
of Russian domain in USA for Russian expatriates living there. Competition on a home
market of Google is out of the question.
The internationalization of Yandex is presented in the exhibit 12.
Exhibit 12. Internationalization of Yandex
Internationalization started International from scratch (1997) - it is an advantage given
from the nature of the Internet company itself; formally first
foreign subsidiary was found in 2009
Main assets abroad The only international subsidiary Yandex Labs was founded in
2009 in the Silicon Valley in California which is used for
research and not to provide services in the USA
Foreign destinations Selected CIS countries’ mass customers
Entry modes Domains opening as a virtual mode of entry
Major deals and projects Domains opening in Ukraine and Kazakhstan; internet market
of Belorussia and Poland as next targets
Expansion approach Regional development in CIS countries
Role of the state Uncertain as the government announces periodically the intent
to interfere to the Internet sphere
3.2 Emphasis of International Strategies
This chapter will first discuss the international strategies’ emphasis and then describe
the implications for Russian multinationals. The focus Russian MNEs make when
entering and operating at the foreign markets is mostly in the marketing, aggressive
investments, establishment relationships, involvement of government, etc. In this part
the branding and government issues will be presented with the cases of the diary food
company WBD and military firm Rosoboronexport.
The food industry in Russia is strongly competitive. There are many sectors of the
market, which are specialized in different products. The competition of Russian and
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International companies is evident in a few sectors of the food market, one of which is
diary.
There are approximately 2 thousand dairy products manufacturers in Russia, and only
5 are really large. Two largest Russian companies are truly international, as they
operate in the CIS markets, and they also explore capabilities to enter markets of
Eastern Europe or Asia.
Despite the average rate of consumption is approximately 250 kg. per person annually
(more than 22 bln. USD), the industry growth rate is moderate and the consumption of
milk and dairy products is also growing at a moderate pace. Milk consumption per
capita in 2008 was 250 kg, and in 2009 – up to 270 kg per person in a rational norm of
392 kg. Total consumption of packaged dairy products in Russia in 2006 amounted to
10.1 billion liters. Declining industry growth rate leads to increase in rate of competition,
which, in context of internationalization, will make sense for Russian producers to go
abroad, and will be an obstacle on the way of foreign MNC’s to enter Russian market.
Russian producer Wimm-Bill-Dann (WBD) is a major player on the Russian dairy
market, and one of the leading players on CIS market, and on the market of Baltic
countries. WBD had created a unified production network in the regions of Russia and
the CIS countries, becoming a national manufacturer in Russia. This group owns 37
manufacturing facilities.
WBD has several highly recognized brands on Russian dairy market as well as several
well-known brands in other food industries. The core markets of WBD’s products
encompass a population of around 280 million people. These markets, including
Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and the countries of Central Asia, are extremely diverse, with
dietary habits shaped by many different national traditions, environments, and
differences in spending patterns.
At the same time, these markets have some important things in common. Each country
had seen sustained economic growth in 2000s, and local consumer markets were
being driven by rising household incomes and the emergence of a mainly urban middle
class that was health-conscious and seek high-quality, healthy and nutritious food and
beverage products.
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The main competitors of WBD in Russia are: Russian company Unimilk and foreign
producers Danone, Ehrmann, and Campina. In mid 2000s Danone’s, Campina’s, and
Ehrmann’s market share was up to 10% while WBD had a market share accounted for
about 30%.
Company has a specified strategy – to produce dairy products directly in the region
where they are consumed, supplying the Russian market with high quality dairy
products at affordable prices. As an entry mode (as well as for further expansion)
company used mainly brownfield strategy.
WBD started to expand to CIS with FDI in 2000, when it bought production facilities in
Kiev (Gormolokozavod) and in Lithuania (Birzu Dairy Grou?). WBD mainly acquires
smaller local firms in Russia and CIS countries. Joint ventures and partnerships with
local producers aren’t attractive to the company – they could very rare provide the
company with any really useful technologies or knowledge. WDB makes focus on the
excellent quality of its products in every country, so it has to invest significantly both in
quality when it buys new production facilities abroad and in ads when launching the
product.
One important treat of the Russian food market is customer’s loyalty to already
established brands. Russian products may be perceived of a low quality, even when
the product itself actually has really high quality. That implied the development of the
strategy based on the development of the series of brands for various markets by
WBD.
In 2006 Danone made unsuccessful attempt to merge WDB. But it bought a significant
equity stake and further increased it. Today Danone owns some 18% of WBD’s shares.
For WBD an opportunity to continue international growth can be the development of the
own brand via co-operation with a global firm. One could say the best way to enter
Europe for WBD is to establish JV. The best partner in this case could be Danone,
because: it has WBD’s shares, so the company is interested in WBD success; it has
established brands in Europe as well as networks and contacts; it has experience in
doing business in Europe.
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Increasing competition and growing pressure from retailers is changing the strategic
priorities of Russian companies’ development. Their main objectives switch to the
establishment or development of own ‘international’ brands, the geographical
embranchment of the marketing and sales promotion in retail networks. In many cases
companies go through a stage of formation of the production base and move to the
stage of building and improvement of marketing system; the strong and highly
recognizable brand became a key factor in the formation of the value for company.
The internationalization of Wimm-Bill-Dann is presented in the exhibit 13.
Exhibit 13. Internationalization of Wimm-Bill-Dann
Internationalization started In 2000 with the active investment to CIS countries
Main assets abroad Facilities in Kiev and in Lithuania
Foreign destinations CIS markets, including Ukraine, Belarus, the countries of
Central Asia
Entry modes Mainly brownfield strategy
Major deals and projects In 2006 Danone unsuccessfully attempted to merge WDB.
Danone owns some 18% of WBD’s shares
Expansion approach To produce dairy products directly in the region where they are
consumed, supplying the Russian market with high quality
dairy products at affordable prices. WBD acquires smaller
local firms in CIS countries
Role of the state An average in the industry where the government is not
generally active
The military industry is without any doubts one of the most controversial areas.
Especially when it comes to the power and influence of the military-industrial sphere
with its incidence on weapons programs which are then criticized for cost overrun,
delays and unsatisfactory performance. Also companies engaged in military industry
are judged for their exports to less developed countries which lead to regional arms
races, international debt and poverty and these companies are also famous for their
bribery and corruption attributes.
Defense firms and industries have a long history which reflects new threats and
technology. The major arms companies of the nineteenth century such as Armstrong,
Gatling, Maxim, Krupp and Vickers (machine guns, armor, battleships) have been
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replaced by new firms, namely, Boeing, Lockheed Martin, EADS and BAE Systems
(aerospace, missiles, elecrtonics).
In 2009 the global military market generated total revenues of $743.9 billion,
representing a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 4.9 % for the period 2005-
2009. In comparison the European market grew with CAGR of 5.7 % and Asia-Pacific
market of 10.4 % which clearly demonstrate the growing potential of that market.
However the Americas still account for 55.4 % of the global market’s value, Europe
generates a further 25.7 % and Asia with Pacific 18.9 %.
Russia’s history had always strong dependence on defense industry. The Soviet Union
acquired its status of super power by obtaining the atomic bomb in 1949, the hydrogen
bomb two years later together with full-spectrum armed forces and possession of more
than five million soldiers. Both historically and logically, the State has the significant
stake in the internationalization of the national military sector.
Rosoboronexport is a state enterprise acting as the only Russian state intermediary
agency for export and import of military and related products, technologies and
services. Rosoboronexport accounts for more than 90% of Russia's annual arms sales.
The company structure comprises more than 1,500 research institutes, design bureaus
and manufacturing plants and has cooperated with more than 60 countries during its
50-year history. Rosoboronexport’s central headquarter was located in Moscow, further
it disposed of representative offices in 44 foreign countries and in 26 major industrial
regions in Russia.
Rosoboronexport is supported by the Russian state with governmental guarantees for
all its export operations. The company is the sole supplier of the whole range of
armaments and military equipment nomenclature produced by Russian enterprises.
The corporation is firmly positioned among world's leading arms exporters. In its role of
the sole state arms trade agency, the company has unique opportunities to promote
long-term beneficial partnerships with foreign customers and to sustain Russia's
leading positions in the global arms market.
In 2009 the company management set up contracts regarding supply of arms at an
amount of $ 15 billion, a significant increase compared to 2007 and 2008. At the
beginning of 2010 value of all orders of the company were about $ 34 bill.
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Nearly 80 percent of the export of Rosoboronexport was conducted with India and
China, whereas in 2008 this habit changed to a more diversified export structure –
Latin American countries, and countries in Africa and Asia have become new
purchasers. The further developments have shown that it is necessary to enlarge
product portfolio. Considering that the company has set up the IJV Rosoboronservice
in India, which concentrated on aircraft industry; its main sales in 2008 took place in
aviation sector, with 56 percent of whole sales force.
In 2006 Rosoboronexport got into the close trade relationship with Venezuela, it even
became Venezuela’s main arms supplier. The deal which was negotiated in 2006 was
about $ 3 billion. The collaboration of Rosoboronexport with Iran and Venezuela
caused bad impact on the US-Russian partnership, as the Bush administration
imposed sanctions on Rosoboronexport. The business relation of Moscow and
Teheran violated a U.S. law known as the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000, which is
aimed at preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction to Tehran.
Rosoboronexport, the Russian state corporation, has been acting in more than 60
countries over 50 years enlarging its product range constantly. Moreover it’s annually
sales stand at $ 34 billion and therefore exceeded the above mentioned benchmark of
$ 100 million. The company did not focus only on export, but also explored sale
subsidiaries in host countries and created binding contracts within supply chain.
When they internationalize, military firms focus on three dimensions. First, having a
foothold in a market which is multi-domestic (for political reasons), second acquiring
technology, and third strengthening its positions in order to reduce competition, and
therefore to increase its chances of getting new contracts.
The crisis has been a hard blow for the sector because of the delays before payment,
due to the lack of liquidity of the states. However as the world's instability is growing the
perspectives of growth for this sector are still high.
Exhibit 14 demonstrates the main international results of Rosoboronexport.
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Exhibit 14. Internationalization of Rosoboronexport
Internationalization started First exports in 1960s; active new stage in 2000s
Main assets abroad The IJV Rosoboronservice in India, which concentrated on
aircraft industry, with 56 percent of whole sales force
Foreign destinations Offices in 44 countries. Nearly 80% of the company export
was traditionally conducted with India and China
Entry modes Exporting; sale subsidiaries; contracting
Major deals and projects Trade with Venezuela with the deal of about $3 billion in 2006.
The collaboration of Rosoboronexport with Iran
Expansion approach Since 2008 a more diversified export structure with the focus
on countries of Latin America, Africa and Asia. Focus not only
on export, but also sale subsidiaries in host countries and
binding contracts within supply chain
Role of the state The state enterprise (the only Russian state agency for export
and import of military and related products, technologies and
services), accounting for more than 90% of Russia's annual
arms sales. Governmental guarantees for all export operations
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CONCLUSION
Future prospects for foreign investments from Russia remain highly promising despite
the somewhat discouraging domestic policies.
Increasing international asset diversification provides Russian companies with
capabilities to match the moves of their global competitors. Domestic economic growth,
large human potential and closing ties with global economy are likely to continue to
drive Russian business expansion abroad.
We tried to evaluate in brief the very general features of national economical sectors
that may help to understand the paths of international expansion of Russian companies
(exhibit 15).
Exhibit 15. General sectoral features of Russian multinationals
Sector Russian companies
Oil and gas The energy sector is traditionally not only economical, but also political
force. Companies are typically large, integrated players that benefit from
their scales of operations.
Electricity Companies are established after the former ministries or state enterprises,
and have the significant experience in the restructuring activities.
Companies explore potential of both resource base and of the government
support.
Metallurgy Companies tend in more cases to use M&A as a mode of entry. Usually
the attention is focused on technological improvements and creation of the
new products. Also through integration, companies tend to strengthen
their position, lower production costs, and expand towards new markets.
Banking Russian banks tend to go abroad mainly to service the investment projects
of Russian companies, that are mainly exporters. The economic reforms
made in CIS become a particularly important factor for the
internationalization of Russian banks in these countries.
Food Only few largest Russian food companies are truly international, as they
operate in the CIS markets, and also explore capabilities to enter markets
of Eastern Europe or Asia. They are mainly both market seeking and
recourse seeking.
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Military As Russia’s history had always strong dependence on defense industry,
all companies in the related activities are state owned or under the strict
government control. Both historically and logically, the State has the
significant stake in the internationalization of the national military sector.
IT and internet Russian companies benefit abroad with the high level of staff education
which provides for better manpower at relative low cost. Incentives for the
local IT enterprises to improve their operations to become potential
service providers for these foreign firms.
Telecom The market in Russia was the fourth-largest in the world in 2008-2009,
after China, India and the US. It has been one of the most attractive
sectors for Russian and foreign investors. Hence, the development of local
market stimulated further outward investments from Russia.
The general characteristics of the international expansion of Russian MNEs according
their sectoral belonging, being presented in the exhibit 16, may be also of high interest
for the further studies of the phenomenon of Russian multinationals.
Exhibit 16. Main findings of the study of international results of Russian MNEs
Foreign destinations Entry modes Expansion
approach
Role of state
Oil and
gas
Mainly CIS, the Baltic
States, Europe, and the
USA. Rarely countries
of Africa, Asia, Latin
America and some
Arab countries
Exporting (as
the main mode),
turn key
projects, joint
ventures and
wholly owned
subsidiaries.
Acquisitions in
trading business
Market-oriented and
profit-seeking
approach.
Greenfield projects
with European
partners. Acquisition
of companies in
highly profitable
distribution
segments
Generally
high state
involvement,
varying
depending on
the
companies’
historical and
political
routes
IT and
Inter-
net
Europe and Asia in anti-
virus and PC solutions,
CIS in searching engine
Exporting;
strategic
partnerships
with the top of
the software
industry; “virtual”
entry more than
physical
Opening regional
offices in European
countries and CIS
The sector
seems to be
less
dependent on
the state than
the rest of
industries
studies
Ban-
king
Mainly CIS, but also
selected countries of
Western Europe, the
UK and the US. Slow
interest to the countries
of Africa, to China, and
Singapore
Subsidiary
banks and
representative
offices through
the
establishment of
control under
foreign
companies
A conservative
approach to
expansion through
organic growth and
a series of strategic
acquisitions. Most
active in the
countries that
actively trade with
Russia
Highly
supported
when state
owned, and
relatively low
if not
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Metal-
lurgy
The US, Australia, the
UK, China, Japan and
Singapore, countries of
Europe, CIS, and
Africa. Highly diversified
presence over the world
Acquisitions with
very few
exception (like
licensing or
greenfield)
Aggressive
acquisitions of low
performing
enterprises in the
strategic countries
of CIS, Europe and
North America
May be
various
depending on
the
government
relations with
the owners
and CEOs
Tele-
com
CIS countries, Eastern
Europe, Middle East,
South-East Africa, and
Asia (with the focus on
India)
Acquisitions of
market leaders
and strategic
partnerships;
more rarely IJV
and licensing
‘Follow the
customer’ strategy.
Expansion in
various forms not
only to CIS
countries but even
further to Asia and
Europe.
Manufacturing in the
countries with the
cheap labor force
The whole
sector is
under the
attention of
the
government.
Forms and
extent of the
interference
may vary.
Support
helps in
cases of
expansion to
CIS
Elec-
tricity
Mainly CIS countries.
Also Northern Europe
and the Baltic states.
Other destinations are
less attractive
Export,
acquisitions,
greenfield
Acquisition of
foreign assets, and
the consolidation of
the position in the
electric power
markets in foreign
markets
Very high.
Government
support is
provided in
case of large
contracts and
projects
Food CIS markets, and the
countries of Central
Asia
Mainly
brownfield
strategy
To manufacture
directly in the region
where the products
are consumed.
Acquisition of
smaller local firms in
CIS countries
The
government
is relatively
passive
toward the
sector, and
the
interference
is from low to
medium
Mili-
tary
Despite exporting to 44
countries, India and
China accounts for the
majority of sales.
Regimes of few Latin
America’s countries are
attractive in terms of the
high demand
Exporting; sale
subsidiaries;
contracting
Quite a diversified
export structure with
the focus on Latin
American countries,
and countries in
Africa and Asia
State
participates
and support
with the
governmental
guarantees
for export
operations
The outward expansion of the national firms is essential for both the individual
companies and the Russian economy as a whole. The companies must become more
international in order to survive in the global competition. Correspondingly, the national
economy requires a structural reform and improvement in competitiveness to transform
Russia from the natural resource based country towards a modern service and
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innovation oriented economy. The outward expansion is perhaps the most efficient way
to force companies to change their old patterns.
Current economic crisis challenges viability of various economic actors. Nevertheless,
the global crisis has not been destructive for Russian multinationals. The profound
approach to the analysis of the crisis impact with the focus on how the Russian
companies might raise their sustainability during the periods of economic disturbances
would require expansion of discussion beyond merchandise trade towards trade in
services, FDI, labor mobility and other forms of international economic collaboration.
In future development of investment environment, further emphasis could be laid on
facilitative and investment capacity building measures. In cooperation with the private
sector, it would be possible to develop the management practices and to launch the
structures necessary to facilitate OFDI. Providing information by bringing together the
potential investors, financial institutions and government would serve as an important
facilitative measure for Russian investors.
Increased expertise on managing cross border transactions and international
investment are examples of the results of efficient public private cooperation in capacity
building. Additional emphasis in OFDI promotion should be laid on transferring of best
practice, by linking investors directly to relevant information on investment opportunities
abroad.
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STATISTICAL  ANNEXES
Table 1.  Outward FDI stock of selected economies, various years (USD billion) 2
Economy 1995 2000 2005 2007 2008
United States 1,363.8 2,694.0 3,638.0 5,228.0 3,071.2
Hong Kong, China 78.8 388.4 471.3 1,011.2 775.9
Russian Federation 3.3 20.1 146.7 370.2 202.8
Brazil 44.5 51.9 79.3 136.1 162.2
China 17.8 27.8 57.2 95.8 147.9
India 0.5 1.9 10.0 44.1 61.8
Source: UNCTAD’s FDI/TNC database, http://stats.unctad.org/fdi/ and United States,
Survey of Current Business, September 2009 and 2006.
Table 2. FDI flows, by region and economy, 2006-2008 (USD million) 3
Region / Economy FDI inflows FDI outflows
2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008
World 1,461,074 1,978,838 1,697,353 1,396,916 2,146,522 1,857,734
  Developed
  economies
972,762 1,358,628 962,259 1,157,910 1,809,531 1,506,528
        European Union 590,305 842,311 503,453 697,193 1,192,141 837,033
        USA 237,136 271,176 316,112 224,220 378,362 311,796
  Developing
  economies
433,764 529,344 620,733 215,282 285,486 292,710
      CIS 44,657 78,074 103,481  23,328 50,125 57,862
          Russia 29,701 55,073 70,320 23,151 45,916 52,390
      South and
      Central America
69,014 105,996 121,418 45,101 26,266 37,255
          Brazil 18,822 34,585 45,058 28,202 7,067 20,457
      East Asia 131,769 150,353 186,982 82,301 111,176 136,156
          China 72,715 83,521 108,312 21,160 22,469 52,150
          Hong Kong, China 45,054 54,365 63,003 44,979 61,119 59,920
      South Asia 27,758 33,982 50,669 14,871 17,758 18,182
          India 20,336 25,127 41,554 14,344 17,281 17,685
      South-East Asia 54,967 69,482 59,923 23,298 45,805 32,117
          Singapore 27,680 31,550 22,725 13,298 24,458 8,928
Based on: World Investment Report 2009
2 Panibratov and Kalotay 2009
3 World Investment Report 2009
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Table 3. Foreign direct investment flows (US$bn)
2009 2010
1 Qtr 2 Qtr 3 Qtr 4 Qtr Year 1 Qtr
Inward 9.4 10.1 12.4 7.0 38.7 9.9
Outward 13.6 11.6 9.8 11.0 46.1 10.3
Source: Russian Central Bank.
Table 4. Ten largest M&A deals by Russian MNEs, 2005-2008 4
Year
Acquiring
Russian
company
Target
company Target industry
Target
country
Shares
acquired
(%)
Estimated/
announced
transaction
value (USD
mn)
2007 Norilsk
Nickel
LionOre
Mining
Gold ores Canada 100 6,287
2008 Evraz
Group
IPSCO –
Canadian
operations
Steel pipe and
tubes
Canada 100 4,025
2007 Gazprom Beltransgaz Natural gas
distribution
Belarus 50 2,500
2008 Evraz
Group
Sukhaya
Balka GOK
Iron ores Ukraine 99 2,189
2008 Lukoil ERG  SpA –
ISAB Refinery
Oil and natural gas Italy 100 2,098
2007 Evraz
Group
Oregon Steel
Mills
Steel works United
States
90 2,088
2005 Lukoil Nelson
Resources
Gold ores United
Kingdom
100 2,000
2007 Basic
Element
Bauholding
Strabag
Industrial buildings Austria 30 1,637
2005 Alfa Group Turkcell Telecommunication Turkey 13 1,602
2007 Basic
Element
Magna
International
Motor vehicles Canada 18 1,537
Source: UNCTAD, cross-border M&A database, http://stats.unctad.org/fdi/
Table 5. Russian OFDI to “western” and “eastern” economies (USD million)
Destination 2007 % 2008 % 2009 %
All the world 45,211 100 54,202 100 44,868 100
Non-CIS
countries
41,967 92,82 51,789 95,55 41,760 93,07
CIS
countries
3,244 7,18 2,413 4,45 3,109 6,93
Based on: Bank of Russia 2010
4 Panibratov and Kalotay 2009
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